This paper uses a dynamic model to study the development of judge-made law.
Introduction
Judge-made law regulates much of economic and private life. The political science literature and much of the empirical legal studies literature has focused on why judges or groups of judges vote the way they do (Segal & Sunstein et al. 2002) . But judges do more than vote, they write opinions de…ning the law. The production of judge-made law has received far less formal attention, especially as compared to the production of legislation.
We view the creation of judge-made law as a rational dynamic choice problem. 1 Prior case law, precedent, provides information about where the legal doctrine has worked and where it hasn't. The judicial opinion reveals to future judges and litigants what a judge has learned from applying the doctrine to a speci…c set of facts.
In practice, judicial opinions di¤er in scope. Based on the investigation of the interaction between the doctrine and a set of facts, some opinions set the rules for a wide range of future activities. For example, in Miranda v. Arizona, 2 the Supreme Court held that Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination required the accused be adequately and e¤ectively apprised of his rights before an in-custody interrogation.
Miranda laid ground rules for police in lots of situations (all those involving in-custody interrogation).
Other opinions set the rules for few future activities. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn 3 provides an example. There, the Court considered whether a newspaper could be liable for revealing the name of a rape victim. The newspaper argued for a broad immunity under the First Amendment. The Court refused, closely tying its decision to the facts of the case: whether a newspaper could be liable for publishing a rape victim's name obtained through public records.
In the model, the judge decides how "broadly" to write the opinion by trading o¤ two kinds of costs: (1) error costs -the costs due to an opinion deciding future cases incorrectly, and (2) decision costs -the costs of hearing future cases. Judges learn about the proper scope of the legal rule by bombarding the legal doctrine with facts from litigated cases. The facts allow the judge to …ll in the law. Each time a judge hears a 1 We use the term judge-made law to mean common law, constitutional law, and the interpretation of broad or general statutory phrases, like "reasonable restraint of trade" under the Sherman Act. 2 384 U.S. 436 (1966) . 3 429 U.S. 469 (1975) .
case he can re…ne the legal rule to account for any new information embedded in those facts.
The critical part of the opinion is what it doesn't say -the issues it leaves open. By
leaving certain issues open, the judge invites litigation on those matters. The gaps in the opinion can be viewed as sign-posts telling litigants where to focus their attention.
In so doing, judicial opinions determine the future ‡ow of litigation and, with that, the future ‡ow of information and facts upon which to make judge-made law. In this setup, the ability to guide the course of future litigation justi…es the publication of opinions.
It also distinguishes judge-made law from legislation. Finally, by focusing on opinions, the model builds o¤ the intuition many lawyers have that the language of the opinion, including any dicta, is important. What the opinion says -and doesn't say -is crucial because it determines the kinds of facts the court will see in the future, which, in turn, determines what the court will be able to learn.
The model o¤ers several predictions about judge-made law that are consistent with actual decisions and doctrine.
First, opinions will narrow over time. The …rst opinion in a doctrinal series will tend to be broad, followed by a string of more narrow re…nements.
Second, judge-made law will di¤er in scope and breath across areas of law. The reason: Decision costs and error costs are not identical in every area of judge-made law.
Consider error costs. Take a contract law opinion that incorrectly decides that certain promises are unenforceable when, in fact, a majority of contracting parties would prefer those promises be enforced. The resulting error is costly, but not dramatically so. The judicial error increases transaction costs because now contracting parties have to draft around the incorrect judicial rule.
By contrast, suppose the court incorrectly demarcates the line between a coerced confession and a non-coerced confession. The error cannot be …xed by private parties or alternative police practices. In the law and economics jargon, the coerced confession rule is an immutable rule. The contract rule is a default rule. Because errors "stick"
with immutable rules, the model predicts that the court will move more slowly in areas of law that involve such rules.
Third, legal doctrine can be inconsistent over time. An opinion in time one that states activity X is illegal will be trumped by an opinion at time 2 that states activity X is legal. Such inconsistency is usually chalked up to judicial miscues or di¤ering pref-erences among judges. The model suggests an alternative justi…cation for inconsistent jurisprudence: judicial learning. The judges update in light of new information and, as a result, reconsider prior decisions. Judges bene…t by cloaking doctrinal inconsistency in language that distinguishes cases that seem indistinguishable. In that way, a judge can use what he has learned to improve the law while maintaining the appearance of a commitment to stability.
Finally, judge-made law will eventually settle, meaning the court will de…ne the law for all possible activities. 4 If decision costs are higher than twice the error costs, the settled law contains errors. The court understands that the legal doctrine works imperfectly for some scenarios, but …xing and further re…ning the doctrine is not worth the e¤ort. The threshold involves double error costs because the court can make two kinds of errors. The court might …nd "liability" for activities where "no liability" is the correct approach or the court might …nd "no liability" for activities where "liability" is the correct approach.
The conventional wisdom is that the courts prefer a settled but imperfect law because of an interest in stability. Here, the law settles because the bene…ts of further error correction are not worth the cost of additional judicial e¤ort.
The model makes several assumptions. We assume a single court that lives forever.
We assume the court consists of judges with identical policy preferences. We assume the court can anticipate and therefore manage the ‡ow of future litigation. Despite these assumptions, the predictions from the model are consistent with the development of a number of important strands of legal doctrine and case law.
The paper unfolds as follows. The next sub-section reviews the related literature.
Section 2 develops the initial building block: an economic model of legal reasoning Section 3 speci…es the model. Here we characterize the features of rational jurisprudence, meaning the most e¢ cient or cost-e¤ective way for judges to learn about the appropriate scope of legal rules. The three propositions in that section contain the main results.
The …rst proposition sets out the relationship between opinion scope and decision costs, error costs, the weight placed on the future, and the amount of information the judge feels is left to be learned. The second proposition demonstrates the conditions under which legal doctrine can be optimally and rationally inconsistent. The third proposition shows that legal doctrine can converge to a set of imperfectly-tailored rules. Following each proposition are real-world examples of the formal results. Section 4 suggests some possible extensions to the model. Section 5 concludes.
Literature Review
This paper straddles the literatures on judicial behavior and the evolution of legal rules.
Scholars of judicial behavior model courts or judges as rational actors seeking to maximize an objective function. The constraints in the models vary and depend on the In all these models, the judge's objective function is given. In the law and economics literature, the evolution of legal rules has been a concern since Judge Richard Posner asserted that the common law was e¢ cient (Posner 1973 ).
In the wake of Posner's assertion, scholars sought to explain the mechanism by which the common law could become e¢ cient. The early models relied on case selection by litigants (Priest 1977 , Rubin 1977 ). Litigants present ine¢ cient rules to the court, while settling cases involving e¢ cient rules. Since the court only sees and agrees to reexamine ine¢ cient rules, the law dove-tails toward e¢ ciency. The validity of these early models has been sharply contested (Had…eld 1992 There has been historical work, pointing out reasons why the common law would tend to be pro-plainti¤ (Klerman 2007 ). For our purposes, the important feature many of these models lack is a forward-looking judge. Case selection drives the law, with judges playing little role. Here, the opposite occurs. 
Legal Reasoning
Law schools train students to "think like a lawyer." What is usually meant by this phrase is the ability to (1) compare two cases; (2) identify di¤erences between the cases; and (3) argue why those di¤erences are important in light of the purpose of the legal rule. If the di¤erences are important, the good lawyer can distinguish the two cases and suggest a reason why case 1 shouldn't be followed in case 2. The prior case law provides information, which can be plumbed for clues about how to decide future cases. In the end, legal doctrine results from showering the legal rule -which will often be phrased in broad and vague terms -with new fact patterns. If the new fact patterns indicate that, as stated, the judge-made rule no longer serves its function, the common law judge is free to reformulate the rule or create an exception.
To capture this process, suppose that the judge-made law is attempting to regulate some activity, x 2 [ 1; 1]. The activity could be anything. It might be the e¤ort expended in driving safely; the actions of police o¢ cers in conducting searches; the amount of legal services a¤orded indigent defendants; or the amount of care owed by producers to end users of their products. Each activity carries a cost, C(x), and a bene…t, B(x). The value of activity x is the di¤erence between bene…t and cost, V (x) = B(x) C(x). Value decreases in the activity. At some point, , value is zero, V ( ) = 0, the bene…t of the activity equal the cost. The threshold point is unknown. It is a random variable distributed according to F ( ) with positive density f ( ) over ;
(with 1; 1). Legal doctrine assesses the costs and bene…ts of some activity in a series of factual situations.
5
Suppose that a case with facts x 1 comes to court. Upon examining the merits of the case and incurring a decision cost, D, the judge learns whether x 1 is greater than or less than . In the event that x 1 > , the court learns that C(
Accordingly, the activity should be prohibited and, in a civil case, the defendant held liable. On the other hand, if
should be permitted and, in a civil case, the defendant held not liable.
In addition, close examination of the facts teaches the court something about the world and, in particular, the random variable : Suppose that the court learns that x 1 >
. From that, the court can infer that cases greater than x 1 ; say x 2 , also have costs greater than bene…ts. This knowledge allows the court to update its beliefs about .
After observing x 1 , the court learns that the random variable must lie below the upper bound, x 1 . In this way, the prior case law provides information about the proper scope of the legal rule. Figure 1 illustrates this idea. The orange arrow represents the set of activities that the court learns have costs that exceed bene…ts after observing x 1 > .
Take an example. A driver is liable for an accident if he acted without reasonable care. 5 When speaking of costs and bene…ts, we take no normative position. The court could measure costs and bene…ts in terms of e¢ ciency. Alternatively, the court could be searching for the most just legal rule, where the bene…t and costs are measured in terms of how much the legal rule advances, say, corrective or distributive justice. The model applies equally to searching for the best legal rule plus exceptions or ‡eshing out the appropriate standard with a series of fact situations.
Theta X 1
Consider …rst a driver who was using his cell phone before a crash. In our model, the court looking at the facts could determine whether the expected loss from the accident outweighed the cost of precaution (waiting to use the cell phone). Suppose it did and the court holds the driver liable. Up to this point, legal reasoning and prior case law have played no role in the analysis.
Subsequently, another case comes to court. In that case, a driver is using his blackberry prior to a crash. The two cases have an important di¤erence: one driver used a cell phone, the other a blackberry. So, the …rst case would not control. Nonetheless, a court reading the case about the cell phone might infer that because the driver was likely more distracted with a blackberry than a cell phone, the expected loss was higher in the second case, while the burden of precaution was roughly the same. As a result, the driver in the second case should be held liable. In this sense, the case law provides information about the costs and bene…ts of activities "close to" the activities described in the prior cases. In our model, the court can impute from the cell phone crash case that any activity more distracting than a cell phone will have more costs than bene…ts.
The court doesn't learn, however, how much less distracting than using a cell phone an activity must be to avoid liability -i.e., the exact value of .
At a higher level of abstraction, consider the following issue: whether an automobile manufacturer should be liable for negligence to the end consumer when a sale transpires through a retail dealer. 6 List all activities x potentially subject to the negligence rule.
The cut-o¤, , is the knife-edge activity where the imposition of negligence liability has equal bene…ts and costs. In deciding the automobile manufacturer case (call that case x 2 ), the court would scan the prior cases for similar activities, like, say, whether drug manufacturers were held liable for negligence to end consumers (call that case x 1 ).
From canvassing the case law, the court learns the costs and bene…ts from imposing a negligence regime on the drug manufacturer. Suppose C(x 1 ) is bigger than B(x 1 );
that is, V (x 1 ) < 0: As a result, the prior court held that the drug manufacturer was liable for negligence, x 1 > . In our model, the court also learns whether x 2 > x 1 . If so, V (x 2 ) < V (x 1 ) < 0 and the court knows that the car manufacturer should also be held liable. If, however, x 2 < x 1 the court only learns that V (x 2 ) > V (x 1 ). The court might have a hunch that, in the car manufacturer case, the bene…ts from imposing liability for negligence outweigh the costs. But it isn't sure. That is to say, the knife-edge activity -where bene…ts equal cost -could be with car manufacturers, or a higher activity.
The court updates its beliefs about the scope of the rule from the prior cases, but the threshold remains unknown.
Formally, let F ( jH t ) be the court's estimate of the posterior distribution over ;
which depends on the case history H t up to time t: The history is just the series of cases brought before time t. The probability that the court will rule in favor of the plainti¤, declaring the activity invalid, when the case is x t is (1 F (x t jH t )). More generally, as of time t, the court has observed a history or series of cases, H t . The court wants to use information from that history to update its beliefs about the posterior distribution of the optimal threshold, F ( jH t ).
Given the learning process described above, the only relevant history includes: (1) the highest past activity that the court found to have positive value and declared valid;
(2) the smallest past activity that the court found invalid, or having negative value.
These two endpoints squeeze the court's estimate of the posterior distribution. The court knows that must lie somewhere between the highest past valid activity and the lowest past invalid activity.
Denote the highest past activity the court declared valid, W t and the lowest past activity the court declared invalid, R t . (We will formally de…ne them later.) For x 2 of this case to prior precedent, see Posner (1990) and Levi (1948) .
[W t ; R t ], the court's updated distribution is
The posterior distribution captures a well-known view on precedent. Relying on past decisions provides information and saves judicial resources. Assuming the prior judgments were correct, the court can take those rulings as given and focus on "new" issues. 7 The posterior formally summarizes Judge Benjamin Cardozo's intuition that "the labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course of brick on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him." (Cardozo, 1921 , p. 249).
The Model
There exists a single court of last resort that lives forever. The court is trying to learn about the policy parameter . In specifying the model this way, we ignore the dynamics between di¤erent judges of a court; there is no logrolling or horse-trading of judicial votes. Moreover, we assume that the judges are identical and, hence, we can use the terms "court" and "judge" interchangeably. We do not allow di¤erent judges to have di¤erent policy preferences. We also ignore the relationship between courts of di¤erent levels, like the Supreme Court and the appellate courts, or the appellate courts and the district courts. Finally, we assume there is no cost from deviating from prior precedent.
The assumption of shared common values and a single court might strike readers as odd. In many areas of law -patent, tax, antitrust -we think the assumption is a 7 The assumption that the court never makes mistakes in determining where the case x t lies relative to the threshold is just a convenient simpli…cation. Allowing for mistakes by the court wouldn't a¤ect the main results over the long term, so long as the average decision was informative. Previous judicial errors would cancel out, enabling the court to extract important information relevant to updating from the prior cases.
reasonable one. In other areas of law, we might think of the model applying to a set of, say, republican or democratic-appointed judges who hold a majority on a court. Unlike the prior literature, the key ingredient is that we don't assume that the judge knows what rule or legal doctrine will accomplish their goals, whatever those goals might be.
The question is: Can they learn about the impact of legal doctrine through the opinions they write and the cases they hear and the facts presented to them?
To learn about the policy threshold, the court issues opinions. An opinion consists of an interval, (a t ; b t ), and has two components, a holding and dicta. The part of the opinion which is necessary for the result is the holding. Anything else the court says is dicta. Suppose that a case, x 1 , is not settled by the litigants. By paying D, the cost of examining the merits of the case, the court uncovers the costs and bene…ts of x 1 . Say x 1 is greater than . From this, the court knows that the activity should be declared invalid. Here, the holding of the opinion is b t . It declares liability for all activities above b t . More to the point, if the court wants to hold the defendant liable, they must set the bound b t less than x 1 . The dicta is the point a t . It says that for activities less than a t there is no liability. This part of the opinion is not essential to the imposition of liability, but it is informative and determines which cases will be brought to court.
The court's opinion can be seen as (1) for some subset of facts x into a legal consequence -liable, not liable. Generally speaking, a rule will govern more fact patterns than a standard (in the model a broader opinion will give rise to a rule), but there is no restriction that a court must stick with a rule or a standard or some combination of both over time. Indeed, the model is general enough to give the court an in…nite degree of ‡exibility between rules and standards. Standards can become more rule-like over time. Rules can become riddled with exceptions. The key feature is that the kinds of opinions the court writes impacts what it learns in the future. 8 
Timing
The timing of the game is as follows:
At the start of period t, the plainti¤ draws a case, x t , from the distribution G(x)
with positive density g(x) over [x; x] with x ; x :
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The plainti¤ makes a settlement o¤er to the defendant. The settlement o¤er depends on the on the "law" available at period t, that is, the court's most recent opinion, fa t ; b t g:
The defendant accepts or rejects the settlement o¤er.
If the defendant rejects the o¤er, the case goes to trial and up on appeal.
If appealed, the court decides the case, updates its beliefs about , and issues an opinion, fa t+1 ; b t+1 g.
Parties settle every case where the court has de…ned the law, in holding or dicta. If x t < a t the court has previously opined that defendants should not be liable for this activity. Since the plainti¤ isn't going to win anyway, he drops his case and avoids the court costs. If x t > b t the court has previously declared the defendant should be liable.
And so, the defendant immediately pays the plainti¤'s damages and avoids the cost of trial. Only when x t 2 [a t ; b t ] will the parties be uncertain about the court's resolution of 8 A narrow opinion leads to more learning than a broad opinion. Other factors also might dictate the contours of an opinion, such as the need to garner a majority of the votes of the court (Cameron and Kornhauser (2008); Friedman (2009)). That said, the model could be easily interpretated as the behavior of the median justice or judge, the judge whose vote controls the outcome. This swing judge can use her opinions to learn about her optimal policy. This assumes, of course, that the swing justice or judge anticipates holding the pivot position in the future. 9 In specifying the model in this fashion (always drawing facts from the same distribution), we abstract away from the law's impact on primary behavior. We do this to ease the analysis and focus on judicial learning. So long as parties either (1) make mistakes about the contours of the law when deciding on their primary activity or (2) face a small probability of getting caught and sued, the court should potentially see cases from the entire distribution each period. We are still working on the model when law changes the underlying distribution, that is, the primary activity levels.
their dispute. We assume that all these cases go to trial and up on appeal. All we want to capture here is that (1) appeals are more likely to occur when the law is uncertain and (2) judicial opinions control how certain the law is.
We can now formally de…ne the highest past activity the court declared valid, W t and the lowest past activity the court declared invalid, R t :
The Jurisprudential Trade-o¤
The court values two things. First, the court cares about time and e¤ort spent evaluating cases, D. Second, the court cares about errors, L. Errors happen when a case settles out of court in the "wrong" direction, given the court's estimate of the posterior distribution,
In other words, an error occurs if, given the law either (1) a plainti¤ drops a case during settlement that would have been decided in favor of the plainti¤ by the court or (2) a case that the defendant should have won is settled in favor of the plainti¤.
It may seem natural to assume that L > D, the loss of an error is greater than the cost of going to court; however, in the formal analysis we do not need to make such an assumption.
To get a better grasp on the concept of errors, an example helps. Suppose that the court sees case 5 and learns that 5. Accordingly, the court knows that activities below 5 have bene…ts greater than costs; the plainti¤ should lose those cases. The court doesn't know what should happen with activities greater than 5. The court might extrapolate that a plainti¤ with, say, case 6 should also lose. Given this belief, the court may set the lower bound a t = 7. In words, the court in deciding case 5 issues an opinion that decides case 6 as well. The court feels comfortable doing this because activities 5 and 6 are quite similar, the cases are hard to distinguish. The broader opinion allows the court to hedge on decision costs. The court avoids the time and e¤ort spent hearing the merits of case 6 because it feels con…dent reasoning by analogy from case 5. But the court could be wrong; might just equal 5, or 5.5. If so and if the next plainti¤ draws 10 We assume that the court would declare the threshold activity as invalid. This is unimportant,
given that x = 0 is a zero probability event.
case 6, an error transpires. Given the law, the plainti¤ anticipates that the court will dismiss its case based on the prior precedent. Accordingly, the plainti¤ drops his case.
Why would the court let an error occur? Shouldn't the court use all the information it has in each period, setting the precedent bounds, fa t ; b t g = fW t ; R t g? True, a "narrow" decision might like this one looks like a good idea. It isn't. Wider bounds mean that the chance of having to decide a case in the following period is higher because the court's opinion is less informative to future litigants. And so, the need to evaluate cases on the merits, which is costly, happens too much. The court isn't relying enough on reasoning by analogy, i.e., extrapolating costs and bene…ts from similar cases. Instead the court is investigating on the merits every case that comes in the courthouse door.
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In setting the precedent bounds, the court trades o¤ the cost of having to decide a case next period against errors that accrue from an inaccurate decision. These single period trade-o¤s are embedded in a dynamic model. The dynamic model means that there is another bene…t from a narrow decision: enhanced learning in the future periods.
By rendering a cautious decision in period one, the court preserves a stream of future cases and the anticipated learning that case load provides. This learning bene…t allows for course correction over the long haul.
To formalize these intuitions, let be the discount factor and let V (H t ) be the court's value function at time t; as a function of the history H t . At the end of period t 1 the court chooses a t ; b t subject to W t a t b t R t to maximize its expected payo¤:
In our model, each judge is identical and cares about the e¤ort expended by future judges. As a result, the judge sets the opinion bounds such that it is not cost-justi…ed (the bene…t in error reduction does not outweigh the cost of investigation of the case) for the judge in the next period to review the case on the merit if that case lies below a t or above b t . Litigants understand that next period's judge won't be motivated to review the case if they bring the matter to court (it is e¢ cient for that judge to simply rely on the prior precedent). And so, these cases settle in light of the prevailing law. Note this does not re ‡ect the court committing not to review the cases. If a case outside the bounds is brought, it is not in the future judge's interest to actually review the case and incur decision cost, D.
The …rst term in (1) is the cost of having to decide a case in the next period. To see why, let's say the judge sets a t = b t . Such a choice de…nes the law for all activities. As a result, all cases settle. The court observes no cases at time t and incurs no decision costs. The greater the distance between a t and b t , the greater the chance the plainti¤ draws a case where the law is unsettled. The second and third terms re ‡ect the expected one-period error costs.
Consider the second term. If the judge sets a t W t , there is a chance the plainti¤ will draw a case x t between W t and a t . Given the opinion's lower bound, the plainti¤ will drop this case. The expression in square brackets is the probability the court attaches to the event that this case, x t , should go in favor of the plainti¤ instead (the activity should be declared invalid). The third term follows from a similar analysis on the upper bound of the decision; here the defendant settles but the activity should be declared valid. The fourth term is the expectation about the future value of the court's objective function, given its opinion choices today. This last term captures the dynamic learning considerations described above.
Note that if the plainti¤ brings to court a case x t 2 (W t ; a t ) ; then equation (1) implies that the court will …nd it optimal to declare "no-liability" for that activity without investigating the case (i.e., without incurring the cost D). Similarly, if the plainti¤ brings to court a case x t 2 (b t ; R t ) ; then the court will …nd it optimal to declare "liability" for that activity.
With the objective function in hand, we can now describe how a court that wanted to learn would trade-o¤ error costs and decision costs. The interval
what is left to be learned about the policy parameter, given the case history, H t . The tighter the interval, the more informed the court is about .
Our …rst proposition suggests when we should observe a court issue a broad opinion versus a narrow opinion versus not investigate the merits of the case at all. The di¤erence b t a t measures the set of cases left uncertain by the opinion; the smaller b t a t ; the broader is the opinion. Thus, it is appropriate to de…ne the "jurisprudential breadth"
at time t as J t = 1= [b t a t ]; the smaller the breadth, the narrower the opinion at time t. The optimal "jurisprudential breadth" depends on four factors: (1) the decision cost D, (2) the error cost L, (3) how much the court thinks it knows about the optimal rule, and (4) future's value (as measured by the discount factor ). We have the following result.
Proposition 1 (i) A narrower opinion is optimal when decision costs are lower, error costs are higher, the future is more valuable, and the court knows relatively more about the optimal doctrine; (ii) A broader opinion is optimal when decision costs are higher, error costs are lower, the future is less valuable, and the court knows relatively little about the optimal doctrine. That is, formally,
Proof:
See the appendix.
If decision costs are low, it doesn't cost much to learn about the bene…ts and costs of a particular activity by investigating the merits of the case. As such, there is no need for the court in an opinion to extrapolate costs and bene…ts from one case to another.
The court can simply consider each activity independently. To do that, the court sets its opinion bounds each period very close to what it knows for sure, fa t ; b t g is very close to fW t ; R t g. This move results in opinions limited closely to the facts of the case. If error costs are low, the cost of extrapolating from one case to another is small. Realizing this, the court can aggressively hedge and place the opinion bounds well in the interior of what it knows. An aggressive hedge saves on decision costs because the court sees fewer cases in the future. Since error costs from issuing a precedent that incorrectly decides future cases are small, this cost savings is worthwhile and pushes the court toward broader opinions.
As the court knows more and more about the optimal policy, it will tend to make smaller and smaller re…nements to the legal doctrine. When the court …rst considers an issue, for example, past opinion are totally uninformative or, the same idea, maximally narrow. In that case the …rst jurisprudential step will tend to be big. More generally, we expect the jurisprudential steps to be inversely correlated with the current breadth of the law. The more fact situations covered by the current law, the smaller are subsequent re…nements to that law.
There is a debate raging between judicial minimalists like Cass Sunstein, who advocate that in most circumstances the court be cautious, rendering a series of narrow decisions (Sunstein 1999 ) and scholars and judges who believe the court owes …delity to the plain meaning of the constitutional text, even if that reading requires a dramatic change in the law. Our model sheds some light on this debate. Narrow opinions are not always called for or prudent, but rather depend on the circumstances and what the court has learned so far. The alternative approach -big swings in doctrine followed by broad rulings -can also be sub-optimal. The reason: Such an approach blocks the court from hearing and learning from a big swath of future cases. In fact, a court rationally optimally will sometimes be a minimalist and other times take broad steps. This is true both over time and across areas of law. And, indeed, when examining actual doctrine we see much of this jurisprudential heterogeneity.
Examples: Doctrinal Trajectory -Broad to Narrow
Proposition one suggests that opinions in a doctrinal series will start broad -when the court doesn't know very much about the contours of the legal rule -and be followed by a series of narrow re…nements. In addition, the opinion language More important, in the last …fty years, the Court has …lled in those phrases, determining their content in a series of opinions, each one narrower than International Shoe itself. 13 Again, we see here the evolutionary pattern -broad to narrow -consistent with the court attempting to learn about proper scope of the doctrine.
This pattern is not con…ned to jurisdictional matters. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment requires the police to provide protective devices to ensure that any statement made during "custodial interrogation" was truly the product of the accused's free choice. Miranda led to police reading criminal defendants'their "rights"in every police station house in the United States. As such, the 13 decision was broad. Like Erie however, Miranda left some matters unresolved. Miranda stated that the warnings are triggered only when a defendant is in "custody"and subject to "interrogation" -two terms left unde…ned. In Miranda's wake, litigation fomented about the meaning of these words. The language in the Miranda opinion drove the future litigation. And, consistent with proposition one, the later decisions tended to be narrower, applicable to far fewer fact situations than Miranda itself.
14 Finally, consider an example from the common law. In tort law, employers are vicariously liable for the torts committed by their employees during the course of employment.
By contrast, the general rule for independent contractors is that employers are not responsible for the acts of independent contractors. 15 The initial rule is broad, applying to every contractual relationship that does not rise to the level of employment no matter the tort committed. The independent contractor rule has been modi…ed with a series of narrow exceptions. The rule does not apply when the employer hires the independent contractor to engage in an activity he knows is inherently dangerous. 16 The rule does not apply when employer hires an independent contractor to do construction in a public place, like a highway. 17 The rule does not apply to independent contractors employed by landlords to provide upkeep for tenants. 18 Each of these exceptions is narrower than the initial rule, which is consistent with the court learning about the optimal contours of the vicarious liability rules for employers using independent contractors. 14 
Examples: Di¤erential Error Costs and Decision Costs
Proposition 1 suggests that opinions will be narrower as the cost of errors goes up. In other words, as losses from errors increase, the court will be reluctant to extrapolate from one set of facts to create exceptions to bright line rules for other fact situations or to modify the prevailing standard. Instead, the court will wait for the facts of a case to tee-up the issue squarely. In this intuitive result, we see an explanation of a number judge-made doctrines.
Courts construe statutes to avoid constitutional questions. 19 Since constitutional rulings can only be changed by the Supreme Court, the Court avoids them if possible.
In the error-cost framework, the Supreme Court wants to avoid making -and thereby potentially making an error in -constitutional decisions because such decisions are stickier than other rulings, which can be modi…ed by legislation.
Recent abortion jurisprudence provides another prominent example of high error that acceptance of a contract occurs upon dispatch.
rarely. There is one primary exception. In the case of option contracts, acceptance occurs upon receipt. 26 Why have the courts been stingy with exceptions to the rule, not allowing modi…cations for other circumstances (where, say, the o¤eree tried to retract the acceptance by phone, after he had dispatched the acceptance by mail)? Our model suggests that the cost of applying the mailbox rule to circumstances where it doesn't quite …t is small. Contracting parties, after all, can just draft around the rule. And so, it makes sense that the mailbox rule has broad applicability and is rarely subject to judicially-created exceptions.
Optimal Inconsistency in Legal Doctrine
Having considered optimal jurisprudential breadth we can now further investigate the evolution of legal doctrine. One aspect of judicial opinions that frustrates legal scholars and lower court judges is inconsistency. The court will make incredulous statements like, "case A, which appears to every lawyer in the country to stand for proposition X, really doesn't stand for proposition X, instead it stands for proposition Y." The usual justi…c-ation is that the judge or justice prefers a certain outcome in the case, prior decisions are a road-block, so the judge re-characterizes previous decisions in a self-serving way. In our model, a court might issue inconsistent doctrine and that inconsistency will re ‡ect learning by the court. This result is expressed in the next proposition. Formally, we say that the jurisprudence is inconsistent if either a t < a t 1 or b t > b t 1 : In the former case, activity x; a t < x < a t 1 was deemed valid at time t 1; but uncertain or invalid in the opinion at time t. In the latter case, activity x; b t > x > b t 1 was declared invalid at time t 1, but uncertain or valid at time t:
Proposition 2 An optimal, rational jurisprudence can be inconsistent.
Proof:
See the appendix. In an incoherent or inconsistent jurisprudence, the opinion bounds bounce around.
Activities that were deemed invalid become valid or uncertain, and levels that were valid become uncertain or invalid: The doctrine doesn't follow a clear pattern. Despite this fact, the court is taking the right jurisprudential approach. An abstract example demonstrates why this might happen.
Suppose that [W t ; R t ] is [ 100; +100] and the court sets Indeed the court may also reasonably decide to set a t+1 = 60: Note that activity levels like x = 55 were deemed invalid at time t; but become valid at time t + 1; levels like x = 70 were invalid and become uncertain. What looks like inconsistent decision-making is really the court optimally gathering and using information from the case 49. Basically, if the court sticks to the old doctrine, the probability of error -the case settling for the plainti¤ when it shouldn't -is much higher. The expected error cost (the probability of an error times the loss) is bigger, so the court recalibrates the opinion bounds to re ‡ect the learning contained in case 49. In so doing, it goes back on what it has previously said.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this example.
The shaded regions in Figure 1 are the probability of an error when the court sets the bounds at [ 50; 50], knowing that the knowledge bounds derived from the precedent are [ 100; +100]. The shaded regions in Figure 2 incorporate the new information from case 49 into the calculus, setting the lower knowledge bound from the precedent at 49.
The error, then, of remaining with an upper opinion bound of 50 is much larger in the next period. So, the court issues an inconsistent decision.
Adding a cost of deviating from precedent doesn't change the analysis. The court will still want to have inconsistent doctrine so long as what is saved in error costs outweighs the cost of not following precedent. And, in fact, if the court can minimize the "perception" that it is not following precedent, it gets the best of both worlds:
learning and reducing errors, while at the same time avoiding any reputational cost from failing to articulate a stable doctrine.
To sum up, legal scholars and political scientists regard inconsistency in doctrine as inevitable, because either (1) courts have multiple judges voting and each one has a di¤erent preference over outcomes (Easterbrook 1987) or (2) courts make mistakes. In our model, we observe inconsistent doctrine under stark assumptions: where judges share a common policy preference and they learn about the e¤ects of doctrine. Inconsistent doctrine, then, can be seen as a result of rational judging by judges committed to the same normative values. It is not necessarily the result of Arrow vote aggregation problems or judicial miscues.
Examples of Inconsistent Doctrine
Together, Parker v. Flook 27 and Diamond v. Diehr 28 provide our …rst example of inconsistent doctrine. Both cases addressed whether computer software counts as patentability subject matter. In Parker v. Flook, the Supreme Court held no, reasoning that software was akin to a mathematical formula and thus not patentable subject matter. In Diamond v. Diehr, the court answered yes. In so doing, the Court did not overrule but instead distinguished Flook. The dissent pointed out that the majority's distinguishing e¤orts were strained, stating:
The essence of the claimed discovery in both [Flook and Diehr] was an algorithm that could be programmed on a digital computer. . . . In Flook, the algorithm made use of multiple process variables; in this case, it makes use of only one. In Flook, the algorithm was expressed in a newly developed 27 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 28 The Court found that the taxpayer lacked standing. In so doing, the Court distinguished
Flast by saying the payments weren't speci…cally authorized by Congress (as in Flast), but instead came out of the general fund allocated to the executive branch. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia said that the consistency in the taxpayer standing cases "lies in the creation of utterly meaningless distinction which separate the case at hand from the precedents that have come out di¤erently, but which cannot possibly be (in any sane world) the reason it comes out di¤erently."
Following Justice Scalia, we might view these three cases as simply inconsistent with one another. Perhaps changing court membership generated the results. But the result is also congruent with the court learning more and more about the impact of authorizing taxpayer suits, disguising inconsistency by creating arbitrary distinctions among the cases.
Convergence without Full Learning
The …nal point the model makes concerns how much time courts should spend re…n-ing doctrine. Legal academics, policy-makers, and advocates often critique the law articulated by courts. Especially in technical areas like patent, tax, antitrust and environmental law, arguments are made that the judicial approach is ‡awed or unwise.
The model shows that imperfections in doctrine are inevitable when the cost of deciding cases is su¢ ciently high. Learning and re…ning the doctrine is costly. At some point, the bene…ts of further re…nement -tweaking the doctrine to better advance the court's interest -are smaller than the costs. The court, then, refuses to say any more on the issue. The next proposition spells out this result. We say that the law converges in …nite 34 
Examples
Many common law doctrines can be seen as well-settled, but imperfect. We end this section with an examples from tort and property.
A tortfeasor will be found negligent if he acts without reasonable care. The negligence standard is a knife-edge inquiry. If the defendant's is found negligent and the negligence causes the injury, the defendant is liable for all the resulting damage. Alternatively, if the defendant is found not negligent, he pays nothing. Calfee and Craswell (1984) show that, when the defendant is uncertain about the legal standard, negligence can result in too much or too little deterrence. There will be too much deterrance if the marginal investment in safety both reduces the amount the defendant can expect to pay (the expected loss) and the chance he has to pay anything at all. In that case, the private gains to an one-unit investment in, say, safety are bigger than the social gains.
The courts have not …ne-tuned negligence law to account for the risk of over-deterrence identi…ed by Calfee and Craswell. On this score, negligence law is imperfect. Yet it is probably not worth the judiciary's time to tailor for these concerns (which involves estimating the probability distribution of damages the defendant thinks he will have to pay). Instead, a rough rule that works most of the time is su¢ cient.
Property law provides property-holders some freedom to engage in self-help in protecting their property. The logic is that the fear of self-help provides additional deterrence, deterrence not provided by uncertain criminal sanctions or civil actions against a judgment-proof tortfeasor (Epstein 1999 p. 51). The self-help remedy is narrowly tailored. In the context of a trespass to chattel or conversion, the property holder is entitled to use reasonable force to defend chattel attempting to be secured by force or fraud. 35 The reasonable force requirement is limited to actions taken in "hot pursuit" of the property. 36 Once the property-holder loses possession, he must resort to the courts to get it back. The "hot pursuit" requirement is well-settled, but likely imperfect.
Think of the cases in a jurisdiction with limited resources to provide criminal sanctions for property theft. There, in terms of optimal deterrence, it might make sense to weaken or jettison the "hot pursuit" requirement. In so doing, the court would boost the deterrence bene…t from the self-help and, as a result, make up for the weak deterrence from the criminal sanction. The courts, however, do not consider the public money available to combat property crime in construing the hot pursuit doctrine. The rule is …xed, but probably not appropriate in every fact scenario (where the "facts" include the amount of deterrence coming from all possible sources). 37 Yet the cost of …xing the doctrine -in terms re…ning the requirement to account for how much deterrence is coming from public o¢ cials -is probably not worth the judicial e¤ort.
Extensions
The analysis might be expanded in a number of ways. First, in the model the judge writing the decision decides on the opinion's scope. In practice, it is often the second judge in the series that decides what the initial opinion means. The future judge can, for example, decide to limit the holding of the prior case to its facts, reading the prior case law narrowly. Alternatively, the future judge could decide to read the opinion 35 37 In terms of the model, assume x represents all cases where a "lack of public enforcement" exception for the hot pursuit requirement might be raised. As x gets bigger, the bene…t for creating an exception gets smaller, while the cost of creating the exception gets bigger. The law settles on no exception whatsoever, despite the fact that in some circumstances an exception might make sense.
broadly, as applicable and informative about situations far a…eld. On this point, we agree. Nonetheless, the words of the initial opinion limit the range of plausible readings by the future judge. A future judge, for example, would …nd it di¢ cult to read Bush v. Gore, 38 as a decision with far-reaching e¤ects. In that decision, the Supreme Court stated: "Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally present many complexities." Similarly, in the case the article began with, Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohen, the Court explicitly stated that the decision was limited to the publication of a rape victim's name obtained through public records.
The model might be expanded to include the possibility that a future judge could select from a range of plausible readings, where the judge faced a reputational cost for deviating too far from the most sensible reading of the prior opinion. In our model, introducing this tweak wouldn't make a di¤erence because all the judges want the same thing. There is, as a result, no reason for a judge to read a case more narrowly or more broadly than intended by the opinion's author. This result would change if we allowed the judges to have di¤erent policy preferences, which takes us to the second possible extension.
We assume that judges share the same normative commitments or values. This is obviously not true, especially in the "hot button" cases. What's surprising is that the model has descriptive power, while maintaining the assumption. We might expand the model to include judges with di¤erent preferences. The interesting twist comes from viewing opinions, as we do here, as a way of shaping the ‡ow of future information to the court. Speculating, we might think of judges as writing opinions, not just to gloss the law with their own values, but also to shape the kinds of cases that will be litigated -and hence what can be learned -by future judges. A judge could write an opinion to settle the law in an area imperfectly (from his perspective), just to prevent the future judges from hearing cases and re…ning the doctrine more to their liking. This is where the range of plausible readings of an opinion comes into play. If the second judge can always limit the …rst judge's opinion to the facts (at zero cost), this move won't work.
The reason: Litigants understand that the …rst opinion is not informative to the future judge with the alternative preference. As a result, anything the …rst judge says will not impact the future case ‡ow. in the opinion.
Finally, the model assumes that judges get information from the case at hand and by canvassing the prior case law. Judges get information from elsewhere too. We might extend the model so that each judge receives a private signal. The informational basis of the opinion, then, is threefold: the private signal, the facts of the case at hand, and the prior case law. In this extension, two judges, facing the same case with the same prior precedent, could reach di¤erent conclusions and write di¤erent opinions.
The judges would disagree because they know di¤erent things, not because they have di¤erent preferences.
Conclusion
Judges in our framework produce law by learning from prior precedent and the facts of the case litigated before them. Once judges can learn, the process by which that learning takes place becomes key to understanding the evolution of doctrine and the production of judge-made law. Opinions de…ne the search, with future disputes the pool from which judges …sh for information.
The model has predictive power for the kinds of opinions we observe, and the vast heterogeneity in the scope of actual judicial opinions. Although we have given a series of examples in the paper, the predictions can also be taken to the data. The central concern here is the informational value and creation of precedent. Precedent and doctrine play a limited role in the vast political science literature on judging, both theoretical and empirical. We have attempted to intergrate those concerns -on the minds of most legal scholars -into a formal framework.
Finally, our model is consistent with what judges claim to be doing, searching for the best resolution of a case in light of the prior precedent, the lawyers'briefs (the information from the case at hand), and their own e¤orts and hunches (expending decision costs).
Proof of Proposition 1
First, we need to write the formula for the expectation E t V (H t+1 ):
The following …rst order conditions are obtained by di¤erentiating (1) with respect to a t and b t , with multiplier t associated to the constraint a t b t , and multipliers a t ;
b t associated to constraints W t a t and b t R t :
They can be rewritten as
V (a t ; R t )
At an interior solution, the …rst order condition (2) and (3) can be rewritten as
Totally di¤erentiating with respect to a t ; b t and the parameter z; z 2 fD; L; ; W t ; R t g, The proposition follows from the following conditions:
Proof of Proposition 2
Assume that and x are both drawn from the uniform distribution over the interval
and that the true value of is = 0: Then it is:
V (H t ) = V (W t ; R t ) = max
Di¤erentiating with respect to b b t (and assuming an interior solution) yields:
Since @EtV (H t+1 ) @bt 0; this gives 
Proof of Proposition 3
The …rst order conditions can be rewritten as
Suppose a t = W t < R t . Then (2) becomes D = ; which can only be satis…ed if b t = a t : Equation (3) ; which can only be satis…ed if b t = R t :
This is contradiction. Hence it must be a t > W t whenever W t < R t :
Similarly, suppose b t = R t > W t : Then ( ; which requires a t = b t ; while (2) becomes D L = ; which requires a t = W t ; a contradiction.
Hence it must be b t < R t whenever R t > W t : This concludes the proof of the …rst part of the proposition. Now consider whether there will be full learning. For full learning to take place in the limit (i.e., a t ! , b t ! ) it must be a t 6 = b t whenever W t 6 = R t . Assume a t = b t and W t 6 = R t . Since, as we have just shown, it is a t = b t = 0; adding up (2) and (3) we obtain
Replacing such value, and a t = b t = 0, into (2) and (3) yields 2D L + 2 V (W t ; R t ) V (a t ; R t ) V (W t ; a t ) 2 t g(a t ) = 0
2D + L 2 V (W t ; R t ) + V (b t ; R t ) + V (W t ; b t ) + 2 t g(b t ) = 0:
be satis…ed if 2D < L: It follows that it cannot be a t = b t , and hence learning will never stop if 2D < L:
Now suppose a t 6 = b t for all values of W t < R t ; and as a consequnce, t = 0. Using this and a t = b t = 0; by subtracting (3) from (2) we obtain
Note that for any " > 0; there exists W t and R t su¢ ciently close to each other, so that the left hand side of (9) is greater than 2D L + ": It follows that if 2D > L; then (9) cannot hold for such values of W t and R t ; hence it cannot be the case that a t 6 = b t for all values of W t < R t : Learning will eventually stop if 2D > L:
